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Stylistic Variation and Stancetaking in the U.S. House of Representatives:  
The American Tax Variable 
 
Gian Peter Ochsner 
 
 
This paper contributes to previous research on how politicians use sociolinguistic variables to index their 
party affiliation, enact stances, and construct political identities. It does so by investigating the 2015 U.S. 
House of Representatives’ debate on repealing the estate tax, with a focus on the indexical meanings of 
the “American tax variable”, which consists of the lexical variants estate tax and death tax. In the televised 
debate, 23 speakers use 31 estate tax tokens and 46 death tax tokens. As the results indicate, the estate tax 
variant indexes an affiliation with the Democrats and a pro-tax stance, whereas the death tax variant is 
linked with the Republicans and an anti-tax stance. Apart from expressing these conventionalised indexical 
meanings, House members also style-shift between the variants and employ them to convey interactional 
stances of (dis)alignment and empathy, construct a political identity of in-betweenness, and promote a 
conservative version of Americanism. 
 
 
1  Introduction  
 
On April 16, 2015, the U.S. House of Representatives voted to repeal the estate tax, a federal inheritance tax 
imposed on the transfer of the estate of a decedent (Fisher 2009:429). While 233 Republicans and 7 Democrats 
voted in favour of eliminating the estate tax, 176 Democrats and 3 Republicans voted against the repeal act (Rubin 
2015). Before the vote, 23 Republicans and Democrats delivered televised floor speeches. The first speaker, 
Adrian Smith, a Republican of Nebraska, rose in support of the repeal act by claiming that it would alleviate the 
tax burden of Nebraska’s small farmers and business owners:  
 
(1) I rise in support of repealing the estate tax. Repealing this death tax is a top priority for  
                      Nebraska’s farmers, rangers, and small business owners. (C-SPAN 2015:16:40–50)   
 
Even though Smith uses the compound estate tax at the beginning of his speech, he shifts to the compound death 
tax to refer to the same kind of tax in the second sentence. Smith underlines this shift in lexical choice by 
employing a vertical palm gesture that is often used to emphasise important words (Goman 2010). Whereas Smith 
highlights his use of the death tax compound with a hand gesture, Mike Thompson, a Democratic representative 
of California, verbally declares his aversion towards Smith’s lexical choice:  
 
(2) I rise in strong support of estate tax reform and in strong opposition to this wrongfully and   
         inaccurately titled “Death Tax Repeal Act”. (C-SPAN 2015:27:30–45)  
 
Hence, these speech excerpts indicate that the compounds estate tax and death tax are two politically charged 
ways of referring to the same kind of tax.  
 The variants estate tax and death tax match Ruette et al.’s (2014:207) definition of a sociolinguistic lexical 
variable as one that consists of “words that mean the same thing, but are used by different people in different 
circumstances”. The compounds comply with this definition because they not only denote the same kind of tax 
but also seem to pertain to the styles, i.e., the “clusters of features” (Moore and Podesva 2009:448) of different 
groups. Without mentioning quantitative studies, both journalists and scholars have argued that Republicans 
predominantly call America’s federal inheritance tax death tax, while Democrats refer to it as estate tax (e.g., 
Green 2001, Schaffner and Atkinson 2010). Because the variants seem to identify speakers as either Democratic 
or Republican, the American tax variable appears to index political persuasion, a group-associational meaning 
that can be added to traditional social group meanings such as gender, age, and class (Hall-Lew et al. 2010:98). 
In addition to ascribing a group-associational meaning to the American tax variable, previous scholars have 
also argued that Democrats and Republicans use the two variants as a means to express their tax position. In the 
longstanding federal inheritance tax debate, Democrats have supported the tax because they see it as an important 
source for federal revenue and a means of redistributing wealth (Schaffner and Atkinson 2010, Baker 2015). One 
way of expressing their pro-tax standpoint is by using the compound estate tax, the variant that directly refers to 
the American tax code (Legal Information Institute n.d.:89) and suggests that only affluent estate owners have to 
pay the tax (Schaffner and Atkinson 2010:122). In contrast, Republicans deviate from the official legislative term 
in order to project their anti-tax position. In the debate, they oppose the tax, arguing that it is an unfair burden for 
farmers and small business owners and a disincentive towards entrepreneurship (Fisher 2009:430–431, Baker 
2015). In order to gain public support for their anti-tax position, conservative opinion leaders began to advocate 
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the estate tax as death tax in the mid-1990s (Schaffner and Atkinson 2010:123). According to Jim Martin, an early 
death tax advocate, the term is intended to spark voter resentment because “death seems like the wrong time to 
tax” (cited in Green 2001:para.3). Hence, the different connotations of the variants show that the American tax 
variable is politically charged. 
 Even though journalists and previous scholars argue that the tax variable indicates party membership, the 
speech excerpts above demonstrate that some House members shift between estate tax and death tax. Thus, this 
paper not only aims at quantitatively corroborating the social group meaning of the tax variable by calculating 
which variant Republicans and Democrats are more likely to use but also examines why some speakers style-shift 
between the variants. Firstly, drawing on Hall-Lew et al.’s (2012:54) suggestion that House members may speak 
more carefully at the beginning of their speeches, I hypothesise that Republicans choose the death tax variant and 
Democrats employ the estate tax variant when they start talking. As a second step, by employing Bell’s (2001) 
audience design model, I ascertain if style-shifters adjust their style of speech to the talk of their peers. Thirdly, I 
follow “Third Wave” (Eckert 2012:93) sociolinguistic studies on stancetaking by discursively analysing how 
Republicans and Democrats shift between the variants in order to create interpersonal (dis)alignments and position 
themselves with respect to the object of their talk and political identities (Jaffe 2009:4–10). In this qualitative 
analysis of stancetaking, I look at co-occurring linguistic features that contribute to the indexical meaning of the 
tax variable (Kiesling 2009:177–179). For example, I investigate how speakers deploy the variants together with 
co-textual evaluative adjectives and judgemental predicative complements (Du Bois 2007:142–143). How this 
quantitative and qualitative analysis of the American tax variable is linked to previous studies is addressed in the 
next section.  
 
2  Previous Works  
 
Previous studies have already examined how politicians use sociolinguistic variables as a resource to express a 
standpoint towards a political issue. For instance, the critical discourse analyst van Dijk (2013:182–194) illustrates 
how members of the U.K. House of Commons employ various linguistic features to express ideologically based 
opinions. As an illustration, in terms of lexicon, van Dijk (2013:189–190) points out that in a 1997 debate on U.K. 
immigration law, Teresa Gorman, a Conservative Member of Parliament, and Jeremy Corbyn of the Labour 
opposition chose different lexical variants to refer to individuals applying for asylum in the U.K. While Gorman 
calls them bogus asylum seekers to index her anti-immigration position, Corbyn refers to them as refugees since 
he sees them as “political refugees” (van Dijk 2013:189) and thus wants to use a word that indicates his pro-
immigration stance. While van Dijk does not investigate the variation in the speech of politicians, this paper also 
includes a discourse analysis of why members of the U.S. House shift between estate tax and death tax.  
 Focusing on a different sociolinguistic variable, Hall-Lew et al. (2010, 2012) have already looked at stylistic 
variation in the House of Representatives. In their study, they use the speeches of the 2007 Iraq troop surge debate 
to examine how Republicans and Democrats pronounce the second vowel of Iraq. As their results show, 
Republicans pronounce it more frequently as /æ/, whereas Democrats realise it more often as /ɑː/. From this 
finding, they infer that House members use the pronunciation of Iraq as a means to index party affiliation (Hall-
Lew et al. 2010:91–101). Apart from establishing the group-associational meaning, Hall-Lew et al. (2012:48–52, 
2007:1) also investigate why 13 Republicans and 23 Democrats switch between two variants of the variable that 
Boberg (1999:49) calls “foreign (a)”. Although Republican style-shifters use /ɑː/ more often at the beginning than 
at the ends of their speeches, perhaps because they pay more attention to using the variant that U.S. speakers deem 
to be more correct (Hall-Lew et al. 2012:54, Boberg 1999:49), neither Democrats nor Republicans style-shift in 
response to the predominant variant of their addressed peers. Since attention to speech only partly explains why 
House members style-shift, Hall-Lew et al. (2012:54) propose that the politicians’ intraspeaker variation can best 
be explicated by analysing their moment-to-moment stancetaking, namely, the “strategic moves made by the 
speaker to present a particular political position or political identity”. As an illustration, they point out that the 
Republican Ron Paul regularly varies between [ɪɹɑːk(i)] and [ɪɹæk(i)] to index a stance of political in-betweenness 
(Hall-Lew et al. 2012:54–60). The current paper is directly related to Hall-Lew et al.’s (2012) study because I will 
largely follow their quantitative and discursive-oriented approach to examine whether the American tax variable 
is equally important in indexing political identity as the foreign (a) variable. 
 The lexical variation between death tax and estate tax has so far only been investigated by political scientists 
and is yet to be addressed in sociolinguistic studies of style-shifting. Whereas Graetz and Shapiro (2001) detail 
how U.S. conservatives used death tax in their public relations campaigns, Schaffner and Atkinson (2010) 
investigate the effect that both of the variants have on the public. For instance, Schaffner and Atkinson (2010:127–
133) demonstrated that when questioned on the estate tax, interviewees expressed the belief that only a few 
American families had to pay the tax; by contrast, when respondents answered questions about the death tax, they 
thought that the tax affected most U.S. families. This paper complements Schaffner and Atkinson’s (2010) study 
because rather than examining how the American tax variable influences the American public’s tax stance, my 
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focus is on how the politicians themselves employ the two lexical variants to position themselves and construct 
their political personae.   
 
3  Data and Method  
 
The data used in this paper consist of all the 25 telecasted floor speeches about the estate tax repeal act of the 
House session on April 16, 2015. The House debate was televised by C-SPAN, an American television channel 
that telecasts the proceedings of official Washington. The broadcast of the debate and transcriptions are available 
online (C-SPAN 2015:16:39–01:42:39). All in all, 13 Republicans and 1 Democrat rose in support of the repeal 
act, while 9 Democrats opposed the bill. By contrast with the other speakers, the 2 floor-managers, Kevin Brady 
(Rep–TX) and Jim McDermott (Dem–WA), both held longer speeches. In addition to the quantitative coding of 
the death tax and estate tax tokens, I made use of the transcripts to analyse the American tax variable in the 
unfolding discourse. 
  In order to explain why House members choose one variant over the other, the methodological framework 
of this paper combined quantitative with discourse-oriented sociolinguistic approaches to stylistic variation. 
According to Schilling (2013a:332), the stylistic macro-patterns across speaker groups and the ever-changing 
linguistic choices of individual speakers at the micro-level of interaction influence one another. Thus, Schilling 
(2013b:167) postulates that sociolinguistic studies should examine “the qualitative patterning of linguistic 
variation in discourse against the backdrop of the large-scale quantitative patterning”. I followed Schilling’s 
(2013b) dictum because I established the group-associational meaning of the tax variable, explored whether 
intraspeaker variation can be explained by the attention to speech and audience design models, and qualitatively 
analysed how moment-to-moment stancetaking affects the indexicality of the American tax variable.   
 As a first step, I established the social group meaning of the tax variable by determining the degree of 
association between the variants and party affiliation. In order to test the null hypothesis that there is no significant 
difference between the way Republicans and Democrats use the tax variable, I counted the number of tokens for 
each variant and each group, cross-tabulated the observed frequencies, and determined the significance level by 
Fisher’s exact test (Gorman and Johnson 2013:219–220). Subsequently, since the politicians’ tax position is part 
of their political identity, I also examined whether there is a correlation between tax stance and the American tax 
variable. I coded the speakers’ tax stance by determining how they voted on the estate tax repeal act (GovTrack 
2015). The politicians’ tax stance largely corresponded with their party affiliation. All Republican speakers 
objected to the estate tax, while 9 out of the 10 Democrat speakers were in favour of retaining the tax. Only 
Sanford Bishop (Dem–GA), a co-sponsor of the Death Tax Repeal Act (C-SPAN 2015:08:36–08:44), did not 
follow the majority pro-tax position of the Democratic Party. 
 The use of Fisher’s exact test, a univariate model, gives rise to an important caveat. I only calculated the 
significance of the correlation between the tax variable and the speakers’ political persuasion and the tax variable 
and their stance on the federal inheritance tax. I did not statistically control for other measurable aspects such as 
ethnicity or regional dialect. Thus, the results are not directly comparable to Hall-Lew et al.’s (2010) study on the 
foreign (a) variable in Iraq. In their study, a multivariate model was used.  
 Apart from determining whether the American tax variable indexes political persuasion, I calculated how 
many House members vary between death tax and estate tax. The politicians also used other formulations such as 
a tax (C-SPAN 2015:18:36), this tax (25:17), this terrible tax (23:11), etc., to refer to the federal inheritance tax. 
However, these variants were not included in the quantitative analysis. The current paper only focused on the 
variation between the death tax and estate tax variants. To investigate the politicians’ style-shifting between death 
tax and estate tax, I tried to find common patterns by subdividing the speeches into three parts and assigning an 
estate tax rate to every third. As a next step, I explored whether attention to speech is a factor that influences time 
course variation. Even though politicians pay great attention to their prepared speeches throughout (Reyes-
Rodríguez 2008:226), Hall-Lew et al. (2012:52) suppose that House members may be more attentive to their 
linguistic choice as they start speaking. Hence, by comparing the estate tax rate between Republicans and 
Democrats over the time course, I assessed whether greater attention at the beginning might lead to a higher 
percentage of one variant. Following Labov (2001:87–94), one would assume that style-shifters use the formal 
variant more often at first. In accordance with Labov (2001), the estate tax compound can be understood as the 
standard variant because it exactly reproduces the tax code, while the death tax compound can be understood as 
the vernacular variant because it deviates from the legislative term. However, as the propaganda intentions of 
death tax advocates such as Jim Martin show (cited in Green 2001:para.3), the death tax variant can also be used 
attentively and not only when “minimum attention is paid to speech” (Labov 1972:112). Thus, by transforming 
the Labovian approach, I hypothesised that Republican and Democratic style-shifters choose the variant associated 
with their party while closely monitoring the first third of their speeches.  
 In addition to the attention to speech approach, I examined whether interspeaker accommodation is a factor 
that leads speakers to style-shift. To determine if stylistic variation is dependent on the speaker’s audience, I drew 
on Bell’s (1984, 2001) audience design framework and Giles et al.’s (1991) accommodation theory. According to 
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Bell (1984:159–178, 2001:142–148), speakers vary in linguistic style because they adjust their style to the style 
of their addressees—and to a lesser extent to that of their auditors and overhearers. It is therefore possible that 
House speakers design their style in response to the speech of their peers before using their own more frequent 
lexical variant. In order to investigate interspeaker accommodation in the House, I examined whether the estate 
tax rate of the first third of a particular speech was similar to the overall rate of the preceding speech and the 
overall rates of the two parties. One aim of analysing interspeaker accommodation was to consider Giles et al.’s 
(1991:19) claim that a convergence in style reflects an individual’s “desire for social approval”. In order to 
examine the motivation of stylistic divergence or convergence, I had to look at the way the variants are embedded 
in the discursive context.  
 For the qualitative analysis of how House members style-shift between estate tax and death tax from moment 
to moment, I drew on what Eckert (2012:93) calls the “Third Wave” of sociolinguistic studies. This approach 
focuses on how speakers employ linguistic variables for interactional purposes and how variants acquire ever-
changing indexical meanings in the unfolding discourse (Schilling 2013a:340, Bucholtz 2009:147). Closely 
related is the notion of stancetaking, namely the way speakers use linguistic forms to create interpersonal 
alignments, position themselves with respect to the object of talk, and construct ever-changing personae and 
identities (Jaffe 2009:4–10, Bucholtz 2009:146). As Kiesling (2009:172) illustrates, it is through these stances 
that linguistic variants acquire interactional and ideological meanings. Thus, according to this understanding of 
style, linguistic variables are indexical signs that take their meanings from the linguistic co-text and extralinguistic 
context (Kiesling 2009:177, Silverstein 2003:195–199). Further, according to Kiesling (2009:172–175), when 
variants are deployed repeatedly to take stances, their interactional meanings become associated with the social 
group that uses them. Hence, by combining the ideas of Schilling (2013a:340, 2013b:157) and Kiesling 
(2009:177–179), I understood meanings that are linked to stances in the unfolding discourse as “interactional 
indexicalities” and social group meanings as “group-associational indexicalities”. Moreover, I called indexical 
meanings of regularly taken stances “conventionalised stance indexicalities”. With these indexical orders in mind, 
I examined how the variants are embedded in the co- and context of the style-shifters’ stancetaking moves, 
ascribed interactional meanings to the variants, and ascertained whether these indexicalities are connected to the 
quantitatively established group-associational and conventionalised stance meanings. 
 
4  Results and Analysis 
 
4.1  Group-Associational Meaning and Conventionalised Stance Meanings  
 
The results corroborate the observation of previous journalists and scholars who argue that Democrats more often 
refer to the federal inheritance tax as estate tax, whereas Republicans more frequently call it death tax (Green 
2001, Schaffner and Atkinson 2010) (Figure 1). Table 1 lists all speakers of the House debate in chronological 
order along with the speakers’ political affiliation, the state they represent, their stance on the inheritance tax, and 
the number of estate tax and death tax tokens they use. Among the 20 speakers who use the American tax variable, 
the 8 Democrats favour the estate tax (N = 27) over the death tax compound (N = 12) (Table 1), using it 69.23% 
of the time (Figure 1). In contrast, the 12 Republicans prefer the death tax variant (N = 34) to the estate tax variant 
(N = 4) (Table 1), which they use only 10.53% of the time (Figure 1). The difference between the Democratic 
ratio (27:12) and the Republican ratio (4:34) in the use of estate tax is significant at the 0.0001 level. Since party 
membership is a highly significant predictor of the lexical choice between the two variants, political affiliation 
can be understood as the social group meaning of the American tax variable. Hence, the American tax variable 
exhibits a similar group-associational indexicality as the foreign (a) vowel in Iraq(i) (Hall-Lew et al. 2010:96).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Estate tax and death tax tokens of Republican and Democratic speakers. 
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Table 1: Quantitative analysis of all 25 speeches 
 
 
 
 
 Alongside the social group indexical meaning, there is also a highly significant (p < 0.0001) association 
between the House members’ stance on the federal inheritance tax and their lexical choice. While the 7 pro-tax 
representatives prefer the estate tax (N = 22) to the death tax variant (N = 6), the 13 pro-tax representatives more 
frequently refer to the federal inheritance tax as death tax (N = 40) than estate tax (N = 9) (Table 1). As previously 
mentioned, the difference between party affiliation and tax stance is the difference of one speaker, Sanford Bishop 
(Dem–GA), who employs the American tax variable more often than all other speakers (Table 1). Since Democrat 
Sanford Bishop, whose speech features 6 death tax variants, does not belong to the otherwise Democratic pro-tax 
Order Speaker 
Party and 
state 
Stance 
Estate tax 
tokens 
Death tax 
tokens 
Total 
tokens 
Estate tax 
rate 
1 Adrian Smith Rep–NE anti-tax 1 2 3 33.33% 
2 Jim McDermott (1) Dem–WA pro-tax 7 0 7 100% 
3 Kevin Brady (1) Rep–TX anti-tax 0 3 3 0% 
4 Mike Thompson Dem–CA pro-tax 5 4 9 56% 
5 Sean Duffy Rep–WI anti-tax 0 1 1 0% 
6 Bill Pascrell Dem–NJ pro-tax 3 0 3 100% 
7 Mike Kelly Rep–PA anti-tax 0 1 1 0% 
8 Ron Kind Dem–WI pro-tax 1 0 1 100% 
9 Roger Williams Rep–TX anti-tax 0 5 5 0% 
10 Lloyd Doggett Dem–TX pro-tax 0 1 1 0% 
11 Ryan Zinke Rep–MT anti-tax 0 4 4 0% 
12 Xavier Becerra Dem–CA pro-tax 0 0 0 — 
13 Erik Paulsen Rep–MN anti-tax 2 1 3 66.66% 
14 Danny Davis Dem–IL pro-tax 0 0 0 — 
15 Kristi Noem Rep–SD anti-tax 0 2 2 0% 
16 Jason Smith Rep–MO anti-tax 0 1 1 0% 
17 Dave Reichert Rep–WA anti-tax 0 5 5 0% 
18 Sanford Bishop Dem–GA anti-tax 5 6 11 45% 
19 Charles Rangel Dem–NY pro-tax 1 0 1 100% 
20 Marlin Stutzman Rep–IN anti-tax 0 4 4 0% 
21 Earl Blumenauer Dem–OR pro-tax 0 1 1 0% 
22 Louie Gohmert Rep–TX anti-tax 0 0 0 — 
23 Will Hurd Rep–TX anti-tax 1 3 4 25% 
24 Jim McDermott (2) Dem–WA pro-tax 5 0 5 100% 
25 Kevin Brady (2) Rep–TX anti-tax 0 2 2 0% 
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representatives, the estate tax rate of the pro-tax representatives (78.57%) is higher than the estate tax rate of all 
Democratic speakers together (69.23%) (Figure 2 and Figure 1, respectively). However, because Sanford Bishop 
also uses 5 estate tax variants, the estate tax rate of anti-tax representatives (18.37%) is higher than the estate tax 
rate of Republicans (10.53%) (Figure 2 and Figure 1, respectively). Thus, overall, the correlation between tax 
stance and lexical choice is not stronger than the correlation between party affiliation and lexical choice. 
Nevertheless, the high significance level shows that the American tax variable is clearly indexical of the House 
members’ stance on America’s federal inheritance tax. From this finding, one can infer that House members have 
so often deployed the American tax variable as a means to position themselves with respect to America’s 
inheritance tax that the estate tax and death tax variants have become conventionally associated with a pro-tax 
and an anti-tax stance, respectively. In sum, while party affiliation can be understood as the group-associational 
meaning of the tax variable, tax stance can be grasped as its conventionalised stance indexicality. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Estate tax and death tax tokens of anti-tax and pro-tax speakers. 
  
4.2  Attention to Speech and Interspeaker Accommodation as Factors for Variation 
 
Although most Republicans consistently use the death tax variant and most Democrats constantly employ the 
estate tax variant to express an anti- or a pro-tax stance, respectively, some speakers style-shift between the two 
variants. Among the 20 speakers who use the tax variable, 15 either have a 100% or a 0% estate tax rate, which 
means that they refer to the inheritance tax either always as estate tax (100%) or always as death tax (0%) (Table 
1). Only 3 Republicans and 2 Democrats vary between the two variants, with estate tax rates ranging from 25% 
to 66.66% (Table 2). Since the ratio of Democratic and Republican style-shifters (2:3) is similar to the ratio 
between the numbers of Democrats and Republicans in the House (188:246), it seems that members of both parties 
are equally likely to shift between estate tax and death tax, at least in this social context. Analysing the style shifts 
of these 5 House members renders it possible to find out if they negotiate the indexical meaning of the American 
tax variable in order to express their political identity.  
 
Table 2: Representatives who style-shift between estate tax and death tax 
 
Speaker Party and state Stance 
Estate tax 
tokens 
Death tax 
tokens 
Total tokens Estate tax rate 
Adrian Smith Rep–NE anti-tax 1 2 3 33.33% 
Erik Paulsen Rep–MN anti-tax 2 1 3 66.66% 
Will Hurd Rep–TX anti-tax 1 3 4 25% 
Mike Thompson Dem–CA pro-tax 5 4 9 55.55% 
Sanford Bishop Dem–GA anti-tax 5 6 11 45.45% 
 
 Before examining the moment-to-moment stancetaking of the 5 variers, I investigate whether attention to 
speech or audience design (Bell 1984, 2001) can account for intraspeaker variation. Figure 3 and Table 3 illustrate 
how the estate tax rates of the Republican and Democratic style-shifters change over the course of the speech. As 
the results show, Democratic variers begin their talks with a relatively low usage of estate tax compounds (22.2%) 
and shift to markedly higher estate tax rates in the middle (83.33%) and at the end (60%) of their speeches. 
Conversely, Republican style-shifters start with a high percentage of estate tax tokens (66.66%) before they 
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markedly reduce their estate tax rate as their speeches progress, ending up at a rate of only 20% in the final third. 
In the context of the House debate, this means that both Democratic and Republican style-shifters begin with the 
variant that is associated with the opposing party before reverting to the variant linked with their own party. The 
attention to speech hypothesis therefore seems unlikely to account for the style-shifting, since Republican variers 
do not begin their speeches with the variant associated with their party (death tax) and Democratic style-shifters 
do not start with the compound that is linked with their partisan lexical choice (estate tax). Furthermore, Dem-
ocratic variers use the less standard death tax variant at the beginning of their speeches when attention to speech 
is thought to be highest. Rather, it appears that Democrats use the Republican variant (death tax) and Republicans 
deploy the Democratic variant (estate tax) at the beginning of their speeches in order to align their lexical choice 
with the predominant variant of their opposing party (because the previous speaker is always a member of the 
opposing party). Thus, despite small token numbers and a small number of speakers, the results appear to support 
Bell (2001) in that speakers design their style in response to the style of their addressees.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Estate tax rate of Democratic and Republican style-shifters over course of speech. 
 
Table 3: Tokens and estate tax rate of Democratic and Republican style-shifters over course of speech 
 
 Beginning Middle End 
 
estate 
tax tok. 
death 
tax tok. 
estate 
tax rate 
estate 
tax tok. 
death 
tax tok. 
estate 
tax rate 
estate 
tax tok. 
death 
tax tok. 
estate 
tax rate 
Democrats  2 7 22.22% 5 1 83.33% 3 2 60% 
Republicans 2 1 66.66% 1 1 50% 1 4 20% 
 
 Audience design is generally manifested when speakers adapt their style to that of their audience. Bell 
(2001:143) writes that this stylistic adjustment corresponds to the concept of “convergence” in the 
speech/communication accommodation theory of Giles et al. (1991). Interspeaker accommodation partly explains 
why 5 House members shift between estate tax and death tax as their speeches progress. Most style-shifters, 
however, do not actually adjust to the lexical choice of the immediately preceding speakers. Rather, they seem to 
use the lexical variant associated with their political opponents before reverting to the predominant variant of their 
own party. Table 4 lists the style-shifters’ estate tax rates over the course of speech along with the estate tax 
percentages of the previous speakers. As the last column of the table indicates, the Republican variers do not 
adjust to the style of the previous speakers because Adrian Smith (Rep–NE) is the first speaker while Erik Paulsen 
(Rep–MN) and Will Hurd (Rep–TX) both follow House members who do not use the American tax variable at 
all. Only 2 speakers, the Democrats Mike Thompson (Dem–CA) and Sanford Bishop (Dem–GA), might be said 
to be referring to the federal inheritance tax more often as death tax at the beginning of their speeches because of 
the rates of the immediately preceding speakers, who both consistently use the death tax compound (Table 4).  
Alternatively, one could also argue that Thompson and Bishop adopt the lexical choice of the Republican Party 
because their starting estate tax rates of 20% and 25%, respectively, are closer to the overall estate tax percentage 
of Republicans (10.53%, Figure 1) than to the preceding 0% rates of Kevin Brady (Rep–TX) and Dave Reichert 
(Rep–WA) (Table 1). Similarly, the three Republican variers together use the estate tax compound at the 
beginning of their speeches almost as frequently (66.6%) (Figure 3) as the Democrats do in general (69.23%) 
(Figure 1). As these percentages suggest, both the Republican and Democratic style-shifters appear to converge 
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towards the lexical choice of their political opponents. Hence, convergent inter-party accommodation may partly 
explain why the style-shifters of the tax debate predominantly use the variants of their opponents at the beginning 
of their speeches. However, adopting the lexical variant of the addressed group does not automatically mean that 
the style-shifters aim at aligning with the political position of the addressed group. In order to find out what the 
style-shifters want to achieve by using non-party variants, I analyse how their lexical choice relates to the 
discursive context.  
 
Table 4: Style-shifters’ estate tax rates over the course of speech 
 
Speaker 
Party and 
state 
Stance 
Beginning 
estate tax rate  
Middle  
estate tax rate  
Final  
estate tax rate  
Overall 
estate tax 
rate 
Rate  
of previous 
speaker   
Adrian 
Smith 
Rep–NE anti-tax 50% no tokens 0% 33.33% 
no previous 
speaker 
Erik 
Paulsen 
Rep–MN anti-tax 100% 100% 0% 66.66% 
no tokens 
(Becerra;  
Dem–CA) 
Will Hurd Rep–TX anti-tax no tokens 0% 33.33% 25% 
no tokens 
(Gohmert;  
Rep–TX) 
Mike 
Thompson 
Dem–CA pro-tax 20% 100% 100% 56% 
0% (Brady; 
Rep–TX) 
Sanford 
Bishop 
Dem–GA anti-tax 25% 66.66% 50% 45% 
0% (Reichert; 
Rep–WA) 
 
4.3  Political Stancetaking as an Explanation of Variation  
 
An analysis of the moment-to-moment stancetaking of the pro-tax Democrat Thompson reveals that he does not 
adopt the lexical style of the previous speaker, Republican Kevin Brady, or the Republicans in general in order to 
align with the Republican anti-tax position. On the contrary, Thompson uses the Republican variant (death tax) 
in the first third of his speech to convey a stance of disalignment from the Republican style, position, and identity. 
Even though Thompson wants to reform the federal inheritance tax, he is against the Republican proposal of 
completely abolishing it. He expresses his pro-tax Democratic position by starting his speech with the estate tax 
variant and shifting to the death tax variant in order to voice his dislike of the Republican lexical choice and their 
idea of eliminating the tax: 
   
  (3)   Mike Thompson (Dem–CA): Pro-tax stance (against the repeal act) 
     1           I rise in strong support of estate tax reform and  
   2  in strong opposition to this wrongfully  
  3  and inaccurately titled “Death Tax Repeal Act”.  
   4  Whenever you hear somebody say death tax,  
   5 know right away that they are not talking about public policy  
  6 and they are not talking about tax reform.  
  7 They are talking about politics.  
  8 There is no such thing as a death tax.  
  9 You won’t find those words anywhere at all in the tax code.  
  10 It’s partisan jargon.  
  11 After you die, you don’t have to pay taxes.  
  12 You don’t have to take out the garbage;  
  13 you don’t get called for jury duty anymore.  
  14 When you’re dead, you’re dead.  
  15 So there is no such thing as a death tax. 
   16 Today my Republican colleagues are pursuing a full repeal of the estate tax  
  17 under the guise of helping family farms and small businesses.  
  18 I wish this were the case.  
  19 But the rhetoric is simply disingenuous when you look at the policy.  
                (C-SPAN 2015:27:34–28:37) 
 
As the beginning of his speech shows, Thompson disparages the way Republicans do politics by claiming that 
their “rhetoric is simply disingenuous” (line 19) and accusing them of misleading the public into the belief that 
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farmers and small business owners would benefit from repealing the tax. One strategy he uses to project a stance 
of strong dissociation from the Republican identity is dismissing their linguistic style. For example, he negatively 
evaluates the Republican lexical choice by pre-modifying the noun phrase “Death Tax Repeal Act” with the 
adjective phrase “wrongfully and inaccurately titled” (lines 2–3). In addition, Thompson negatively assesses their 
lexical style by rejecting the referential meaning of death, the compound modifier, when he explains that the 
federal inheritance tax does not apply to dead Americans: “After you die, you don’t have to pay taxes” (line 11). 
Finally, with an epistemic stance of high certainty, Thompson wants all listeners to “know” (line 5) that the death 
tax compound is only “partisan jargon” (line 10). With the same stance of epistemic certainty, he even goes so far 
as to deny the existence of the death tax variant because he points out that it is not mentioned in the tax code, 
and—as if stating a fact—he proclaims that “there is no such thing as a death tax” (line 15). In sum, even though 
at the beginning of his speech, Thompson adjusts to the lexical choice of the Republican Party, he only does so to 
criticise their word choice and to distance himself from their political style and identity. Hence, Thompson’s 
example shows that it is not always the case that speakers—as Giles et al. (1991:19) maintain—converge with the 
speech of their interlocutors in order to gain their approval.  
 Whereas Thompson employs the death tax variant in a dismissing way, the moderate Democrat Bishop, 
initially adjusts to the lexical choice of the Republicans in order to align with their tax stance:  
 
  (4)   Sanford Bishop (Dem–GA): Anti-tax stance (in favour of the repeal act) 
 1 Mr Speaker, I’m pleased to join Representative Brady on this important  
  2 bipartisan legislation to repeal the death- death tax once and for all.  
 3 I’ve always believed that the death tax is  
 4 literally misguided, morally unjustified, and downright un-American.  
 5 It’s really a tax on success. (C-SPAN 2015:01:09:48–01:10:05) 
 
As the first sentences of Bishop’s speech indicate, he employs the death tax variant in order to express his support 
of the Republican anti-tax position. After saying that he is “pleased to join Representative Brady” (line 1), the key 
sponsor of the repeal act, he decides to choose the death tax variant. It is possible that the stammering repetition 
of the modifier death indicates that he consciously deviates from the dominant variant of his party (estate tax). 
After introducing his agreement with the Republican Party on this matter by starting his speech with the death tax 
token, Bishop goes on to deploy the variant to make the same anti-tax arguments as the Republicans. For instance, 
he deploys the death tax compound in a stance that expresses his dislike of the federal inheritance tax. By linking 
the evaluative subject complements “literally misguided, morally unjustified, and downright un-American” (line 
4) to the subject death tax, the variant acquires a series of negative indexical meanings. It becomes associated 
with immorality, a position that is incompatible with Americanness, and—as the propositional phrase of the next 
sentence indicates—with something that inhibits success. By linking the variant to these indexical meanings, 
Bishop aligns with the Republican Party and with Brady in particular because the latter makes similar indexical 
links when he argues that the death tax is an “immoral tax, an attack on the American Dream”, and a tax that 
“punish[es] success” (24:2–25:57). In claiming that the death tax is “un-American” (Bishop in Example 4, line 4) 
and an “attack on the American Dream” (Brady in 24:2–25:57), these anti-tax politicians also convey a patriotic 
stance, namely, a stance of protecting America’s national identity. At the same time, they distance themselves 
from the pro-tax Democratic estate tax users, whom they accuse of undermining Americanism. Consequently, 
Bishop starts his speech with the death tax variant to dissociate himself from the tax-friendly views of his own 
party, align himself with the Republican pro-tax position, and express a patriotic stance.  
 Although Bishop begins his speech with the death tax compound to mark a stance of alignment with the 
conservative views on taxation, he starts style-shifting towards the middle of his speech. This back-and-forth 
switching between death tax and estate tax points to his in-between political identity. According to the website 
OnTheIssues (Gordon 2015), Bishop, who is a member of the Congressional Black Caucus, can be described as a 
liberal populist, a political philosophy between social liberalism and right conservatism. In the House debate on 
the federal inheritance tax, Bishop expresses his intermediary political position by alternating between the two 
variants of the American tax variable. Even though he begins his speech with the death tax variant, he shifts to 
the estate tax compound when he statistically compares the inheritance tax of different nations and refers to the 
pro-tax argument of some people, namely the Democratic tax supporters: 
 
  (5)   Sanford Bishop (Dem–GA): Anti-tax stance (in favour of the repeal act) 
 1 The United States has the fourth-highest estate tax  
 2 in the industrialized world at 40 percent.  
   …{00:34}… 
 3 Some people have argued that the estate tax is no longer a serious problem  
   4 since we have permanently raised the exemption to 5 million dollars for individuals. 
                                               (C-SPAN 2015:01:10:43–01:11:31) 
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Bishops’ lexical style-shifting runs through his speech because overall, he uses the estate tax variant 5 times and 
the death tax variant 6 times (Table 2). It is possible that Bishop shifts regularly between the Democratic estate 
tax and the Republican death tax variant as a strategic means to convey and construct a moderate political identity.  
Thus, Bishop’s use of the American tax variable is similar to the way Ron Paul (Rep–TX) made use of the foreign 
(a) variable in the 2007 Iraq troop surge debate: as Hall-Lew et al. (2012:55–7) illustrate, Republican Ron Paul, 
who supported the Democratic anti-surge position, enacted his political in-betweenness by regularly shifting 
between [ɪɹɑːk] and [ɪɹæk].  
 While Bishop style-shifts between the two American tax variants to communicate and shape his in-between 
political identity, Paulsen and Hurd, two rather conservative Republicans (Gordon 2015), shift from the estate tax 
to the death tax variant to move from a stance of collective empathy for taxpayers to one of personal empathy for 
single tax-affected constituents. For example, Paulsen uses the estate tax variant when he communicates his 
compassion with all farmers who are “affected” (line 1) by the federal inheritance tax: 
 
  (6)   Erik Paulsen (Rep–MN): Anti-tax stance (in favour of the repeal act) 
 1 Farmers can be affected by- impacted by the federal estate tax  
 2 simply based on the value of the farm land alone  
  3 and that does not even take into account, Mr Speaker,  
  4 the buildings, the equipment, the livestock,  
  5 and other non-liquid assets that are present.  
  5 I spoke to a Minnesota family business  
  6 who was forced to be spending 20%, 20% of their net income  
  7 on an expensive life insurance just to fund their future death tax obligations.  
  8 That’s money that’s not being used to expand and grow the current business.  
                (C-SPAN 2015:58:04–58:32) 
 
Interestingly, as Paulsen narrows his focus and begins recounting a story of an individual tax incident in 
Minnesota, he switches to the other variant. Hence, by embedding the death tax compound into a narrative that 
tells the story of how a family business suffered from the tax, Paulsen associates the variant with a stance of 
empathy for single tax-affected constituents he knows. Later in the debate, Paulsen’s stancetaking move is 
repeated by Hurd: 
 
  (7)   Will Hurd (Rep–TX): Anti-tax stance (in favour of the repeal act) 
 1 As land values continue to increase,  
 2 any farm and ranch families are concerned  
  3 that this may trigger the estate tax.  
  4 As Bobby and others can attest to,  
  5 the death tax is devastating to the family farms, ranches, and small businesses  
  6 in my district and throughout the Nation.  
 7 Come on, y’all.  
 8 Let’s stop punishing families for achieving the American Dream. 
 9 I support this bill to repell- to repeal the death tax. (C-SPAN 2015:01:23:52–01:24:16) 
 
As Hurd talks about all farm and ranch families who are worried about the tax costs, he refers to the federal 
inheritance tax as estate tax. Hence, when he enacts a stance of collective empathy for farm families in general, 
he deploys the estate tax variant. It is only after pointing to the personal testimony of Bobby (line 4), a “seven-
generation cattleman” (01:23:08), whom he knows personally, that he shifts to the death tax variant. Therefore, 
when both Paulsen and Hurd empathically associate with the personal fate of single constituents of their districts, 
they use the death tax variant. By contrast, when they project a stance of collective empathy for tax-affected 
farmers, they refer to the inheritance tax as estate tax. Hurd’s last sentences in the excerpt above associate the 
death tax variant with a further conservative indexical meaning. Like Brady, Hurd takes a patriotic stance of 
protecting the Republican version of the “American Dream” (line 8), an anti-regulation (i.e., anti-tax) dream of 
self-reliance, individual achievement, and financial success (Holloway 2014:3). However, discursively comparing 
this conservative indexical subfield of the death tax variant with the social liberal connotation of the estate tax 
variant goes beyond the scope of this paper. For such a comparison, the stancetaking of speakers who only use 
one variant would have to be analysed as well. 
 In sum, examining the discursive environment of the American tax variable has revealed that the lexical 
variers of the House strategically style-shift to create (dis)alignments, express political views, and shape their 
political identity. For instance, Democrat Bishop adopts the Republican lexical style in order to express a stance 
of inter-party alignment. Other variers, however, adjust to the variant of their political opponents for other reasons, 
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thus ascribing different interactional meanings to the American tax variable: Democrat Thompson makes use of 
the Republican death tax variant to criticise it as “partisan jargon” (Example 3, line 10) and the Republicans 
Paulsen and Hurd employ the Democratic estate tax compound to project a stance of collective empathy for all 
farmers suffering from the tax. While Paulsen and Hurd use the estate tax variant in a way that contradicts its 
conventionalised pro-tax indexicality, they deploy the death tax compound in a way that corresponds to its 
conventionalised anti-tax meaning because they use it to take empathetic stances for individual tax-suffering 
constituents. Lastly, Bishop makes use of the death tax variant to project a patriotic stance and shifts between 
estate tax and death tax to express and construct his in-between political identity. Overall, even though the style-
shifters of the House make use of the group-associational meaning and the conventionalised stance indexicalities 
of the tax variable, they also add new interactional meanings to the variants that do not always correspond to the 
regularised indexicalities.  
 
5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper adds to previous research on how sociolinguistic variables are used in political discourse by 
demonstrating that House members deploy the American tax variable for various political purposes: they employ 
it to index their tax stance, create inter-party (dis)alignments, enact situationally relevant stances, and express and 
construct political identities.  
 The quantitative analysis of the 2015 House debate established the group-associational meaning of the tax 
variable and revealed that the style-shifters converge across party lines. As the results indicate, the death tax 
variant is associated with Republican House members and an anti-tax stance, whereas the estate tax variant is 
linked with Democratic representatives and a pro-tax position. Even though these group-associational and tax 
stance indexicalities are conventionalised and 15 speakers stick to one variant during the debate, 3 Republican 
and 2 Democratic speakers shift between the two variants for strategic reasons. Contrary to my attention to speech 
hypothesis, Democratic and Republican style-shifters do not use the variant associated with their party most fre-
quently as they attend carefully to the beginning of their speeches. Rather, they initially adjust to the lexical style 
of their opposing parties. However, as the discourse-oriented analysis revealed, only Democrat Bishop adopts the 
death tax variant in order to align with the Republican anti-tax position. The other style-shifters adapt to the style 
of their political opponents for other purposes. For instance, Democrat Thompson employs the Republican death 
tax variant to dismiss the Republican rhetoric as political propaganda and distance himself from the Republican 
identity. Furthermore, the Republican style-shifters Paulsen and Hurd employ the Democratic estate tax variant 
when they enact a stance of collective sympathy for farmers affected by the tax. These examples show that stylistic 
convergence is not always motivated by a desire for social approval. 
 A further important finding of the qualitative analysis is that some interactional indexical meanings are 
directly or indirectly related to the conventionalised social group and tax stance meanings, whereas others 
contradict them. For instance, by employing the estate tax variable in order to express a stance of collective 
solidarity for all tax-paying farmers, Paulsen and Hurd use the estate tax compound in a way that conflicts with 
its conventionalised pro-tax indexicality. On the other hand, they make use of the death tax compound in a way 
that is compatible with its pro-tax indexical meaning because they deploy it when they communicate their empathy 
for tax-affected individuals. In addition, Democrat Bishop, Republican Brady, and Republican Hurd enact death 
tax stances that indirectly point to the Republican group-associational meaning of the death tax variant because 
they all employ this compound to take a patriotic stance of protecting the conservative version of Americanism. 
Lastly, Democrat Bishop intermixes the social group meanings of the death tax and the estate tax variant in order 
to convey and construct a moderate political identity in between U.S. Republican conservatism and U.S. 
Democratic liberalism. Thus, although the two tax variants are associated with relatively stable group-
associational and tax stance indexicalities, the indexical meaning potential of the American tax variable can be 
renegotiated in the unfolding interaction. This finding shows that even in the strictly regularised environment of 
the bipartisan House of Representatives, speakers make strategic lexical style shifts to renegotiate their political 
personae and identities. From a methodological viewpoint, the results of this paper also demonstrate the value of 
qualitative analysis for interpreting patterns identified in quantitative data. 
 Future sociolinguistic studies of political discourse should not only look for other politically charged 
sociolinguistic variables but also re-examine my findings with a larger data sample and analyse in more detail 
how the tax variable is employed in the unfolding discourse. For example, it would be interesting to see how the 
estate tax and death tax variants are embedded in a Democratic and Republican narrative of the American Dream 
and how they are linked to the semantic fields of Democratic social liberalism and Republican economic 
liberalism.  
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